Sunday, April 15, 2007

Ethics in Practice

To borrow a great passage from the essay titled; " multicriterial value incrementalism" by David Johnson and Matthew Silliman,

" No intelligent and sensitive person, we suspect would let her neighbor drown to avoid harming a frog or dog-but neither would she feel totally indifferent to the animal's sacrifice..."


Although this passage was aimed at explaining why a moral theory that addressed both "basic moral concern for a wide range of sentient life, and significant moral differences among those beings", i think it is vital for this entry because it helps me address the moral theory behind what is normally considered an act of common sense. If made to choose between saving the life of a cat and fellow human being, irrespective of our relationship to the partied involved, the obvious answer will be the human being but this decision has more to do with our moral obligation and societal expectations rather than a common sense decision. No let's examine the moral basis of this claim. Why is it morally defensible to save a child over a pet you love dearly, why is it morally acceptable to chose if forced to save your child over your pet or better yet some stranger over your beloved animal companion?

Children and domestic animals like cats and dogs on the basis of the egalitarian view are both sentient beings and should have an equal moral value thus treated equally. In the same light, animal rights activist and members of the general public will display their displeasure if you choose to save an animal over a human stranger irrespective of your relationships to either one -human or non-human! The decision to save the human being over the non-human animal prima facie (for their face value) is a great example of ethical values being rooted in our daily actions so much so that we do the morally right thing without much deliberation and pondering.

1 comment:

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

Doing the right thing in this instance might be the product both of strong moral intuitions about the relative degrees of harm involved and our (in this instance beneficial) anthropocentic training.